Quick update on WOW

WideOpenWest (US: WOW) – last price 5.01 – last notes here

This afternoon, having rescheduled the conference call from AM to PM – what a tell that was, in retrospect – our long national nightmare is over, with the consummation of the WOW/Digitalbridge/Clearview merger for $5.20 per share announced (see here). In retrospect, much of the recent analysis was reasonably accurate, in that WOW was certainly pot committed to the deal, after an extremely elongated process; the evaporation of other credible buyers, and listed options; and having spent a king’s ransom on advisers and lawyers in the lead-up to the deal. On the other hand, some of the earlier analysis that led to the conviction in the position – namely that the buyer would be forced to give value to the equity for much of the greenfield, as-yet-unearning capex, and that shareholders would not accept a price unless it came with a significant bump to the original offer – turned out to be wrong. In sum, I am happy this got over the line, finally; and, probably like most shareholders at this point, at the same time relieved but slightly disappointed with the price.

I will leave the hand-wringing and self-analysis for another time – this turned into a mediocre investment outcome and whilst no means a disaster, there are certainly things that could have been done better here during the last 14 months. Still I think it is important not to over-generalize, or over-extrapolate; and the old adage ‘time kills all deals’ clearly was not correct, here at least, as in many ways this was a quintessential ‘n of 1’ situation. No doubt we will learn a lot more from the proxy, and perhaps I will comment again after reading that document.

I have taken the $5.01 on offer in the after-market, will now close this legacy position, and recycle the proceeds into other names that appear more attractive – within the names left in the model book, principally TFG.

4 thoughts on “Quick update on WOW

  1. I bought more of this recently in small size (1% of portfolio in addition to previous sub 0.5%) when it dropped under $3.50, with the thinking that the upside/downside ratio had shifted significantly to a favorable margin. It seemed like the market was weighting greater than 50% chance of no deal if one were to assume a worst case break price of $2.50, where the equity stub would have been ~0.75x EBITDA. My break plan was to buy even more if it did dump down to the $2.50 range, because I reasoned that either a) the bidders would be back for round two in future, or b) The company would fairly soon have to curtail their capital spending, and the cash flow story would become more apparent. Worst case scenario c) nothing good happens and Crestview uses Ch11 to take full control down the road.

    The thought process behind the recent upsize was built on some of what I’ve learned from reading your work over the years, so thank you again Jeremy.

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